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HODGSON V. MINNESOTA: BALANCING THE COMPETING
INTERESTS OF THE STATE, PARENTS AND MINOR-A
MISSED OPPORTUNITY?
I. INTRODUCTION
The landmark decision of Roe v. Wade I established that the constitu-
tional right to privacy encompassed a woman's choice to terminate her
pregnancy through abortion. 2 This controversial 1973 ruling inspired a
plethora of legislation as states sought to define the parameters of the
abortion right; many states enacted statutes imposing informed consent,
spousal consent and hospitalization requirements.
Further testing the scope of Roe, some state legislatures enacted
regulatory provisions requiring parental consent or notification 3 before
a minor could obtain an abortion. These parental involvement statutes
purported to further the legitimate interest of the state in protecting the
welfare of pregnant minors, and-to some extent-the parents' interests
in the control and well-being of their pregnant child. Parental consent
and notification provisions have been successfully challenged, however,
when the asserted state and parental concerns supplant the minor's au-
tonomy and fundamental right to choose abortion.
In Hodgson v. Minnesota,4 the Supreme Court addressed the constitu-
tionality of a Minnesota statute 5 requiring an unemancipated minor 6 to
notify both of her parents 7 of her intent to obtain an abortion at least
forty-eight hours8 before the procedure was performed. 9 The Minne-
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id. at 153. Noting that the Constitution does not explicitly provide for a right to
privacy, the Court recognized that the right is found in the concepts of personal liberty
and restriction upon state action contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 153-54.
3. Consent provisions require the minor to secure parental approval of her decision
to obtain an abortion. In contrast, notification provisions require the minor to inform her
parents of her decision to have an abortion. Whether, in reality, "parental consent" is
significantly different from "parental notification" remains to be seen.
Statutes differ with respect to the number of parents involved in the minor's decision;
the state may require either single-parent or two-parent involvement with various excep-
tions. See infra appendicies 1 and 2 and notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
4. 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
5. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (West 1989).
6. Minnesota has no statutory definition of "emancipation." See Streitz v. Streitz,
363 N.W.2d 135, 137 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). The Supreme Court, however, accepted the
Minnesota case law notion of an emancipated woman as one who is living apart from her
parents or who is either married or has borne a child. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2931 n.3
(applying MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.341-.342 (West 1989)).
7. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(3) (West 1989) provides in part: " 'parent' means
both parents of the pregnant woman if they are both living, one parent of the pregnant
woman if only one is living or if the second one cannot be located through reasonably
diligent effort, or the guardian or conservator if the pregnant woman has one."
8. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(2) (West 1989) provides in part: "[N]o abortion op-
eration shall be performed upon an unemancipated minor or upon a woman for whom a
guardian or conservator has been appointed.., until at least 48 hours after written notice
of the pending operation has been delivered [to the parent]."
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sota statute provided no exception regarding notification of a divorced
or noncustodial parent.' 0 In anticipation of a challenge to the statute,
the Minnesota legislature incorporated a provision that became effective
if ever a court enjoined the two-parent notification requirement."l This
alternative proviso retained the core notification requirements of the
original statute, but provided a judicial bypass proceeding whereby a
mature or "best-interests" minor could seek court approval of her deci-
sion instead of notifying her parents.' 2 Through two different majori-
ties, the Supreme Court held that the primary two-parent notice
provision alone was unconstitutional,' 3 but that the same two-parent
notification requirement withstood constitutional challenge when ac-
companied by the judicial bypass alternative.
14
This Comment examines the Supreme Court's treatment of the
most restrictive' 5 parental notification statute in the Nation. Part II
traces the progression of Supreme Court abortion rulings from the rec-
ognition of a woman's fundamental right in Roe through cases limiting
the scope of Roe with respect to parental consent and notification provi-
sions. Part III surveys the facts and procedural history of Hodgson, pro-
viding a synopsis of the Justices' divergent opinions. Part IV presents an
analysis of the Hodgson decision including: (1) a discussion of the com-
peting interests of the state, parents and minor; (2) application of the
judicial bypass alternative and (3) the burdens of two-parent notifica-
tion. Part V concludes that the Supreme Court has validated a statute
that surpasses both the degree of regulation necessary to effectuate the
legitimate interest of the state in protecting the welfare of pregnant mi-
nors and the parents' interest in the well-being of their child. Unlike the
9. An analysis of the constitutionality of delay requirements is beyond the scope of
this Comment. For a general discussion of the issue, see Debra Harvey, Note, Zbaraz v.
Hartigan: Mandatory Twenty-Four Hour Waiting Period After Parental Notification Unconstitution-
ally Burdens A Minor's Abortion Decision, 19J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1071 (1986).
10. See supra note 7.
11. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(6) (West 1989) provides in part:
If subdivision 2 of this law is ever temporarily or permanently restrained or en-
joined by judicial order, subdivision 2 shall be enforced as though the following
paragraph were incorporated as paragraph (c) of that subdivision; provided, how-
ever, that if such temporary or permanent restraining order or injunction is ever
stayed or dissolved, or otherwise ceases to have effect, subdivision 2 shall have
full force and effect, without being modified by the addition of the following sub-
stitute paragraph which shall have no force or effect until or unless an injunction
or restraining order is again in effect.
12. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(c)(i) (West 1989) provides:
If such a pregnant woman elects not to allow the notification of one or both of her
parents or guardian or conservator, any judge of a court of competent jurisdic-
tion shall, upon petition, or motion, and after an appropriate hearing, authorize a
physician to perform the abortion if said judge determines that the pregnant wo-
man is mature and capable of giving informed consent to the proposed abortion.
If said judge determines that the woman is not mature, or if the pregnant woman
does not claim to be mature, the judge shall determine whether the performance
of an abortion upon her without notification of her parents, guardian, guardian,
or conservator would be in her best interests and shall authorize a physician to
perform the abortion without such notification if said judge concludes that the
pregnant woman's best interests would be served thereby.
13. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2947.
14. Id. at 2961.
15. See infra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
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Minnesota two-parent notification provision, a single-parent notice re-
quirement, combined with a judicial bypass option, would better balance
the competing interests of the state, parents and minor. A single-parent
involvement provision protects the welfare of pregnant minors and en-
courages minors to consult a parent without imposing an undue burden
upon a minor's fundamental right to choose abortion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Recognition of the Fundamental Right
Although Roe established that the right to privacy encompassed a
woman's decision to choose abortion, 16 her freedom of choice is not
absolute and "must be considered against important state interests in
regulation." 7 Reaffirming "strict scrutiny" as the applicable standard
of review, the Supreme Court observed that regulation of a fundamental
right is justified only by legislation that is narrowly drawn to express a
compelling state interest. 18 Compelling interests include those that
safeguard maternal health and protect certain potential life. 19
Applying the Roe standard, the Court determined that the impor-
tant state interest in the mother's health became compelling at the end
of the first trimester, and its interest in protecting potential life became
compelling at fetal viability. 20 During the first trimester of pregnancy,
therefore, the woman and her physician could choose to terminate the
pregnancy without state interference.
2 1
B. Restricting A Minor's Fundamental Right
Since Roe, the Supreme Court has decided several cases concerning
the constitutionality of statutes restricting a minor's fundamental right
to obtain an abortion through parental consent and notification provi-
sions. One such case of particular importance is Planned Parenthood v.
16. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. The Court noted that only personal rights, which can be
deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," are included in the
guarantee of personal privacy. Id. at 152 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
17. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
18. Id. at 155 (citing Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) and
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 163-65. "Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks), but
may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks." Id. at 160.
21. Id. at 163. Roe's trimester framework for limiting a state's authority to regulate
abortions "is inherently tied to the state of medical technology that exists whenever partic-
ular litigation ensues." Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
458 (1983)(O'Connor, J., dissenting). As a result, Roe's trimester standard may be ill-
suited for analysis as technological developments move the point of fetal viability further
toward conception and enable the states to regulate the performance of an abortion at an
earlier point in the pregnancy. Id. ("As medical science becomes better able to provide for
the separate existence of the fetus, the point of viability is moved further back to concep-
tion."). See also Jan G. Laitos, The abortion question: Reasoning of Roe vs. 11'ade out of date,
ROCKY MTN. NEws, Mar. 1, 1989, (Colorado Views), at 37 (questioning whether the exer-
cise of a woman's right to an abortion should "vary according to the progress of medical
technology").
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Danforth.22 There, the Court addressed a constitutional challenge to a
Missouri statute regulating the performance of abortions by requiring
the written consent of one parent or a person acting in loco parentis unless
the abortion was necessary to protect the mother's life.
23
The Danforth Court recognized that minors, as well as adults, re-
ceive constitutional protection because "[c]onstitutional rights do not
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-
defined age of majority."' 24 The Court observed, however, that states
may regulate the activities of children to a greater extent than is permis-
sible for adults.2 5 This greater degree of control is reflected in the
Court's application of the less-stringent standard of "intermediate re-
view" to the challenged parental consent provision. Using an ends-
means analysis, which required only a "significant state interest" to con-
dition a minor's abortion on the consent of a parent, the Court demon-
strated the application of this intermediate standard.2 6 In contrast, the
Court employed the "strict scrutiny" standard to provisions of the stat-
ute as applied to adult women.
Heeding the Roe requirement of narrowly drawn statutes that regu-
late fundamental rights, 2 7 the Danforth Court held the parental consent
provision unconstitutional. It concluded that the asserted state interests
did not justify an absolute and possibly arbitrary parental veto over the
decision of the minor to terminate her pregnancy. 28 In so ruling, the
Court observed that the award of parental veto power would not
strengthen the family unit or enhance parental control "where the mi-
nor and nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict that the
very existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the family struc-
ture." 29 Although the Danforth Court placed the minor's autonomy
before the asserted state and parental interests, the majority emphasized
that its holding did not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or
maturity, may give effective consent to an abortion. 30 The Court, in-
stead, limited its holding to statutes imposing unjustified third-party
consent requirements as a prerequisite to a mature minor's abortion.
3 1
In 1979, the Supreme Court presented guidelines that, if incorpo-
22. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
23. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.020(4) (Vernon 1974). The plaintiffs also challenged statu-
tory provisions concerning fetal viability, informed consent, spousal consent, the standard
of care for physicians, the custody of infants who survived an attempted abortion, amni-
ocentesis, and reporting and record-keeping requirements. See id. §§ 188.010-040.
24. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (citing Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); Goss v. Lo-
pez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)).
25. Id. at 73-75 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
26. Id. at 75. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's inconsistent application of
standards of review in the abortion context, see Note, Leading Cases: L Constitutional Law; E.
Right to Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 247 (1990).
27. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
28. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.





rated, would have salvaged the infirmities of the Missouri statute under
scrutiny in Danforth. In Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti IJ), 32 the Court addressed
a facial challenge to a Massachusetts statute requiring the consent of
both parents before a minor could obtain an abortion.3 3 Unlike the con-
sent provision struck down in Danforth, the Massachusetts statute pro-
vided for judicial authorization of the minor's abortion for "good cause
shown" when one or both parents refused consent.
3 4
The Bellotti II plurality observed that a child's peculiar vulnerability
and inability to make informed, critical decisions-together with the im-
portance of the parental role in child rearing-justified regulating a mi-
nor's fundamental rights to a greater extent than those of an adult.
3 5
The parental consent requirement of the Massachusetts abortion statute
reflects that legislature's desire to exercise greater control over abortion
rights of minors. The Bellotti II plurality concluded, however, that a
pregnant minor was entitled to avoid a parental consent requirement
through a judicial determination where either (1) she was mature and
capable of giving informed consent independent of her parents' inter-
ests, or (2) the abortion was in her best interests regardless of her level
of maturity.3 6 The plurality also noted that the judicial proceeding
should ensure the pregnant minor's anonymity and be expeditiously
conducted to allow the minor an effective opportunity to obtain the
abortion.3 7 Thus the Court attempted to balance the pregnant minor's
constitutional right with the state's interest in encouraging parental in-
volvement by safeguarding against provisions that would amount to the
veto power found impermissible in Danforth.3 8 The plurality empha-
sized the balance that the bypass procedure lends to the competing in-
terests rejecting the contention that, as a general rule, two-parent
consent requirements unduly burden a minor's fundamental right to ob-
tain an abortion.
3 9
The plurality determined that the Massachusetts statute was uncon-
stitutional because it failed in two respects to satisfy the articulated stan-
dards for a valid restraint on a minor's right. First, the statute permitted
judicial authorization to be withheld from a minor who was otherwise
32. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). In Bellolti 1, reported as Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132
(1976), the Court vacated the judgment of a three-judge panel of the district court which
had sustained a facial challenge to the statute. The Supreme Court held that the district
court erred in not abstaining and certifying questions concerning the meaning of the stat-
ute to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. On remand, the district court certified
nine questions to the state court. Following the judgment of the state court, the district
court again found the statute unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement.
Bellotti II, the appeal from the district court's ruling on remand, is a plurality opinion.
Justice Powell's lead opinion was joined by ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun joined in Justice Stevens's concur-
ring opinion. Only Justice White dissented.
33. MAss. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983).
34. Id.
35. Bellotti 1, 443 U.S. at 634-37.
36. Id. at 643-44.
37. Id. at 644.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 649.
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found to be mature and capable of giving informed consent.40 The plu-
rality observed that ajudge could, in effect, place the state's and parents'
interests above those of the minor and deny authorization. 4 1 Second,
the statute required parental involvement before the minor was afforded
an opportunity to receive a judicial determination. 4 2 Under Bellotti II's
guidelines, a pregnant minor must have an opportunity to obtain judi-
cial approval of her decision without first consulting her parents; 43 the
pregnant minor may be denied authorization only where the court is not
persuaded that the minor is mature or that the abortion would be in her
best interests.
4 4
Both Danforth and Bellotti II involved statutes that conditioned a mi-
nor's right to abortion on parental consent to her decision. In contrast,
the Supreme Court first addressed a constitutional challenge to a paren-
tal notification statute in H.L. v. Matheson.4 5 This 1981 case presented a
facial challenge to Utah's notification provision requiring a physician to
"notify, if possible" the parents of a pregnant minor before performing
the abortion. 46 The statute did not provide a judicial bypass alternative
to the minor.
The plaintiff, a pregnant minor living with and dependent upon her
parents, asserted that the statute was unconstitutional because courts
could construe it so as to apply to all unmarried minors who were ma-
ture or emancipated. 4 7 The Court found, given the plaintiff's depen-
dence upon her parents and her failure to allege that she was mature,
that the minor lacked standing to advance the overbreadth argument. 48
Nevertheless, the Court upheld the provision only as it applied to imma-
ture and dependent minors. The Court reasoned that, as so limited, the
statute was reasonably calculated to protect that class of pregnant mi-
nors by "enhancing the potential for parental consultation concerning a
decision that has potentially traumatic and permanent consequences." '49
Over a sharp dissent,50 the Matheson Court observed that the Utah
statute did not afford parents the veto power characterized by some con-
sent provisions and noted that the "mere requirement of parental notice
does not violate the constitutional rights of an immature dependent mi-
nor." 5 1 In effect, the lesser degree of intrusion accompanying notifica-
tion, in contrast to requiring parental approval under a consent
40. Id. at 651.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 647.
44. Id. at 647-48.
45. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
46. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304(2) (1990).
47. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 405.
48. Id. at 406.
49. Id. at 411-12.
50. Led by Justice Marshall, the dissent rejected the majority's narrow holding
grounded on a lack of standing. Moreover, the dissent argued that state-imposed notifica-
tion results in the same infringement on the minor's right as does a consent requirement.
Id. at 425-41.
51. Id. at 409 (quoting Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 640).
[Vol. 69:3
HODGSON V. MINNESOTA
provision, enabled the statute to survive a constitutional challenge with-
out incorporation of the judicial bypass alternative. As applied to the
class of immature and dependent minors, the statute furthered the inter-
ests of the state in protecting the welfare of its minors and preserving
family integrity, and was narrowly drawn to protect only those
interests.
5 2
In 1983, the Supreme Court upheld an entire parental consent stat-
ute regulating a minor's right to abortion. That statute was the one
challenged in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft 53 requiring an uneman-
cipated minor to (1) secure the consent of one parent or (2) obtain a
court order for "good cause" shown before she could obtain an abor-
tion. 54 Adhering to the criteria set forth in Bellotti II for a valid restraint
on a minor's abortion right, 55 the question presented in Ashcroft was
whether the Missouri statute provided a judicial alternative that satisfied
those criteria without unconstitutionally burdening the minor's right.
56
The Supreme Court concluded that the interest of the state in protect-
ing immature minors sustained the consent requirement because of the
judicial bypass alternative. Because a court could not deny a pregnant
minor's petition "for good cause" unless it first found that the minor
was immature, the statute avoided any constitutional infirmities.
57
The Ashcroft dissent, however, emphasized that Bellotti II did not
command a majority, and thus, the Court was not bound by the judicial
bypass guidelines. 58 It further maintained that ajudicial proceeding im-
poses a burden on the minor of at least the same degree as obtaining
parental consent and that the discretion inherent in the proceeding re-
sults in nothing less than a judicial veto of the minor's decision to obtain
an abortion. 59
In Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (Akron HJ),60 the com-
panion case to Hodgson, the Supreme Court upheld a parental notification
statute prohibiting the performance of an abortion upon an unmarried,
unemancipated minor unless, inter alia, the physician provided notice to
52. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 411-13.
53. 462 U.S 476 (1983).
54. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
55. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 493.
56. Id. at 491. Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger viewed the issue as a matter of
statutory construction and applied the Bellotti II criteria. Id. at 491-92. Justices O'Connor,
White and Rehnquist concluded in a concurring opinion that the provision was valid be-
cause it imposed no undue burden on the minor's fundamental right. Id. at 505.
57. Id. at 493.
58. Id. at 504. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens joined Justice Blackmun's dis-
senting opinion.
59. Id.
60. 110 U.S. 2972 (1990). In City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health
(Akron I), 462 U.S. 416 (1983), the Court held unconstitutional an ordinance that prohib-
ited, inter alia, the performance of an abortion on a woman under 15 years of age unless
the physician obtained the consent of one parent or the minor received judicial authoriza-
tion. The Court stated that the judicial proceeding failed to meet the standard provided
by Bellotti II, and was invalid because the ordinance made a blanket determination that all
minors under the age of 15 are too immature to provide informed consent or that an
abortion would never be in their best interests without parental consent.
1992]
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one parent, or the minor received judicial authorization to obtain the
abortion.6 1 The majority concluded that the notification requirement
and accompanying judicial bypass procedure did not impose an uncon-
stitutional burden on the minor's right since the statute was in accord
with the guidelines propounded by the Court in previous abortion rul-
ings. 62 The bypass proceeding allowed the minor to avoid parental no-
tification by establishing either her maturity or that the performance of
the abortion, without notification, would be in her best interests. 63 Fur-
thermore, the statute provided for an expedited and confidential deter-
mination of the minor's petition if she sought a judicial bypass. 64 The
Court left unanswered, however, the question of whether parental notifi-
cation statutes must contain a judicial bypass alternative to be held consti-
tutional. 65 Recall that the Ohio statute included a bypass procedure
that satisfied Bellotti II's standards, but the Ashcroft Court stated only that
"it is a corollary to the greater intrusiveness of consent statutes that a
bypass procedure that will suffice for a consent statute will suffice also
for a notice statute."
66
III. HODGSON V. MINNESOTA
A. Facts and Procedural History
On July 30, 1981, two days before the effective date of the Minne-
sota parental notification provision, 67 the plaintiffs68 commenced their
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
challenging the constitutionality of the statute and seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief.69 The primary requirement of the statute de-
manded an unemancipated minor notify70 both her parents of her intent
61. Akron 11, 110 S. Ct. at 2982. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.85 (Anderson 1990).
62. Akron II, 110 S. Ct. at 2981-82.
63. Id. at 2979.
64. Id. at 2979-80. The Court rejected the challenges to: (1) the constructive author-
ization condition of the bypass provision; (2) the standard for establishing maturity or
best interests and (3) the pleading requirements. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.85(A)-
(C) (Anderson 1990).
65. Akron II, 110 S. Ct. at 2978-79.
66. Id. at 2979.
67. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (West 1989). The statute amended the "Minors'
Consent to Health Services Act" which remains in effect as §§ 144.343(1) and 144.346.
For a brief discussion of the Act, see Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2931.
68. The plaintiffs included six class-action minors who claimed to be mature, two phy-
sicians and four abortion clinics in Minnesota. They argued that notification of one or
both parents of the minors would not be in the minors' best interests. A mother of a
minor plaintiff claimed that notifying the minor's father would not be in the minor's best
interests.
69. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756 (D. Minn. 1986). The plaintiffs alleged
violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
and various provisions of the Minnesota Constitution.
70. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(4) (West 1989) states:
No notice shall be required under this section if:
(a) The attending physician certifies in the pregnant woman's medical record that
the abortion is necessary to prevent the woman's death and there is insufficient
time to provide the required notice; or
(b) The abortion is authorized in writing by the person or persons who are enti-
tled to notice; or
[Vol. 69:3
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to obtain an abortion at least forty-eight hours before the procedure was
performed. 7 1 The Minnesota legislature incorporated a judicial bypass
provision, however, that was to become effective if the primary two-par-
ent notification requirement was ever temporarily or permanently en-
joined.72 Under this contingency, a pregnant minor could obtain a
waiver of the notification requirement if the court determined that the
minor was mature or that the performance of the abortion, without pa-
rental notification, was otherwise in her best interests. 73 The statute
provided that the bypass hearing must be confidential and be given pre-
cedence over other matters. 74 An expedited appeal was available to mi-
nors who were denied judicial authorization by the lower court.
75
The district court temporarily enjoined the pure notification provi-
sion of the statute before its effective date, but allowed the enforcement
of the notice-bypass provision since it was constitutional per se. The
court determined, however, that the plaintiffs should have an opportu-
nity to offer evidence in support of their allegations that the notice-by-
pass provision was unconstitutional as applied. 76 During a five-week
trial, the court considered, apart from the remainder of the statute, both
the forty-eight hour delay and two-parent notification requirements.
The district court held that the waiting period was unconstitutional per
se because it unduly burdened the opportunity of pregnant minors to
obtain an abortion. 77 The core two-parent notice requirement, without
the judicial bypass, was also held unconstitutional because it failed to
promote the interests of the state and placed an unjustified burden of
obtaining parental approval on mature and "best-interests" minors.
7 8
The trial court determined, however, that the judicial bypass procedure
complied both on its face and in practice with the guidelines established
by the Supreme Court 79 although extensive factual findings suggested
that the procedure did not significantly further the interests of the state
(c) The pregnant minor woman declares that she is the victim of sexual abuse,
neglect, or physical abuse as defined in section 626.556. Notice of that declara-
tion shall be made to the proper authorities as provided in section 626.556, sub-
division 3.
71. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(5) (West
1989) provides in part: "Performance of an abortion in violation of this section shall be a
misdemeanor and shall be grounds for a civil action by a person wrongfully denied
notification."
72, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(6) (West 1989). See supra note 7 and accompanying
text.
73. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(6)(c)(i)(West 1989).
74. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(c)(iii) (West 1989) provides in part: "[p]roceedings in
the court under this section shall be confidential and shall be given such precedence over
other pending matters so that the court may reach a decision promptly and without delay
so as to serve the best interests of the pregnant woman."
75. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(c)(iv) (West 1989) states in part: "[a]n expedited
confidential appeal shall be available to any such pregnant woman for whom the court
denies an order authorizing an abortion without notification. An order authorizing an
abortion without notification shall not be subject to appeal."
76. See Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2934.
77. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 779.
78. Id. at 778.
79. Id. at 775-76. See 4shcroft, 462 U.S. at 476; Bellotti 1, 443 U.S. at 622.
19921
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
in protecting pregnant minors or fostering intrafamily communica-
tion.8 0 While the forty-eight hour delay provision was severable from
the remainder of the statute, the statute could not be given effect in the
absence of the two-parent notification requirement.8 ' Accordingly,
though the judicial bypass was held constitutional in isolation from the
remainder of the statute, the two-parent notification requirement neces-
sitated that the statute be enjoined in its entirety.
82
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed,8 3 thus rejecting the state's
argument that the two-parent notification requirement was constitu-
tional without a judicial bypass option.8 4 Concluding that a bypass pro-
cedure was constitutionally required under Bellotti II, Ashcroft and
Matheson,8 5 the Eighth Circuit determined that the two-parent notice re-
quirement was valid only when accompanied by the judicial bypass alter-
native.8 6 The appellate court considered the statute as a whole and
stated that, by providing for a judicial bypass, the statute safeguards
those minors for whom parental involvement may not be in their best
interests, while at the same time encouraging parental involvement for
those minors who may be greatly assisted at a difficult time.8 7 Although
the district court's factual findings concerning the burdens associated
with the two-parent notice requirement and judicial bypass raised "con-
siderable questions about the practical wisdom of the statute," the
Eighth Circuit deferred to the decision of the legislature.
8 8
Both parties appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Minne-
sota challenged the determination of the Eight Circuit that the pure no-
tification provision was unconstitutional.8 9 In contrast, the plaintiffs
challenged the approval of the same two-parent requirement when ac-
companied by the judicial bypass alternative. 90 The Supreme Court,
however, affirmed the holdings of the Eighth Circuit in two different ma-
jority opinions.
In the first opinion, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and
O'Connor joined Justice Stevens in striking down the primary two-par-
ent notification provision. In the second, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White and Scalia joined Justice Kennedy in upholding the two-
parent notice requirement with the appended judicial bypass. As be-
80. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 775-76. Between August of 1981 and March of 1986,
judges denied only nine of the approximately 3500 judicial bypass petitions. In addition,
the judges-hearing 90% of the petitions-viewed the process as a means to affix a "rub-
ber-stamp" to the minor's decision. Id. at 781.
81. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(7) (West 1989) provides in part: "[i]f any provision
•.. of this section ... shall be held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect the provisions...
which can be given effect without the invalid provision ..
82. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 780-81.
83. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988)(en banc).
84. Id. at 1456.
85. Id. at 1462.
86. Id. at 1464.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1459.
89. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2927.
90. Id. at 2961.
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tween the two opinions, Justice O'Connor provided the swing vote in
the decision by concurring with the judgment upholding the two-parent
requirement when it was accompanied by the bypass procedure.9 '
B. The Stevens Majority
The Stevens majority began its scrutiny of the pure notification pro-
vision by noting that none of the Court's prior decisions in the abortion
context focused on the significance of involving both biological parents
in the abortion decision. 92 The majority then summarized the unchal-
lenged factual findings of the district court concerning the distinction
between one and two-parent involvement.
9 3
The majority noted that-on the basis of testimony amassed at trial
concerning the impact of the statute in operation-the district court
found the two-parent notification requirement had harmful effects on
both the minor and custodial parent where the parents were divorced or
separated. 9 4 Some minors anticipated reestablishing their relationship
with the absent parent after gaining that parent's advice, and were often
disappointed when reestablishment did not occur.95 In addition, the re-
action of the custodial parent to the requirement of forced notification
was often one of anger, resentment and frustration at the intrusion of
the absent parent. 96
The district court also found that involvement of the absent parent
was especially detrimental when the minor came from an abusive, dys-
functional family. Studies, introduced into evidence, suggested that vio-
lence and harassment often continued well beyond the divorce,
particularly where children were involved, and notification of the mi-
nor's pregnancy and abortion decision could provoke further violence.
9 7
Moreover, the district court believed that "a mother's perception in a
dysfunctional family that there will be violence if the father learns of the
daughter's pregnancy is likely to be an accurate perception."
'9 8
The two-parent notification requirement also had adverse effects in
families where the minor lived with both parents in circumstances in-
volving domestic violence. Even where minors lived in fear of physical
and sexual abuse, few invoked the statutory exception to notice because
of the reporting requirements and attendant loss of privacy. 9 9 Conse-
quently, the two-parent notification requirement actually reduced, in-
stead of fostered, intrafamily communication. Minors who would
ordinarily notify one parent were dissuaded from doing so when notifi-
91. Justice Marshall filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which
Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined. Justice Scalia also filed a separate opinion concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part.
92. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2938.
93. Id.
94. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. 756, 768-69 (D. Minn. 1986).
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cation would involve the parent "in the tortuous ordeal of explaining to
a court why the second parent should not be notified."' 0 0
Justice Stevens then analyzed the statute while considering the dis-
trict court's extensive findings of fact. Noting that the state did not rely
primarily on its asserted interest in protecting the welfare of pregnant
minors in defending the statute, Justice Stevens concluded that instead
it concentrated on its interest in protecting the right of the parents "to
determine and strive for what they believe to be best for their chil-
dren."' 0 ' Wherever the emphasis, neither of these interests justified the
two-parent notification requirement according to Justice Stevens. He
concluded that the state had no legitimate interest in (1) questioning
one parent's judgment that notice to the other parent would not benefit
the minor and (2) in presuming that the custodial parent was incompe-
tent to make decisions concerning the minor's health and welfare.
10 2
Thus, the two-parent requirement was unconstitutional because the
"combined force of the separate interest of one parent and the minor's
privacy interest must outweigh the separate interest of the second par-
ent" in shaping the child's values and lifestyle.
10 3
C. The Kennedy Dissent to the Stevens Majority
Justices Kennedy, White, Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist dis-
sented from the portion of the Stevens opinion that struck down the
primary two-parent notification requirement of the Minnesota statute.
The dissent maintained that a state furthers legitimate ends when it at-
tempts to foster and preserve intrafamily relations by "giving all parents
the opportunity to participate in the care and nurture of their chil-
dren."' 1 4 The Kennedy dissent rejected Justice Marshall's assertion
that Minnesota attempted, through the two-parent notification require-
ment, to force families to conform to a state-designed ideal.' 0 5 Instead,
the dissent supported the state's interest in providing information to
both parents by arguing that such an interest was valid regardless of
whether the child was living with one or both biological parents, or the
particular relationship between the parents.
10 6
The Kennedy dissent further observed that the notification statute
was consistent with joint custody laws in Minnesota since it enabled di-
vorced or separated parents to share the legal responsibility and author-
ity for making decisions regarding their child's welfare.1
0 7
Furthermore, the dissent asserted that the state did not dictate in-
trafamily communication by requiring parental notice. The Court ar-
100. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2939 (discussing Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 769).
101. Id. at 2946. See Brief of Respondents at 28-29, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct.
2926 (1990) (No. 88-1125).
102. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2946.
103. Id. at 2946-47.
104. Id. at 2963 (emphasis added).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2964.
107. Id. at 2964-65.
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gued that Minnesota acted only on the common-sense proposition
that-in counseling their minor child-parents could best fulfill their
roles only when fully informed of the child's medical condition and rela-
tive choices. '0 8
The dissent criticized the Stevens majority for doing the state and
"our constitutional tradition a sad disservice by impugning the legiti-
macy" of such essential objectives. 10 9 In conclusion, Justice Kennedy
stated that the permissive language and incorporated exceptions of the
statute, combined with the less demanding nature of a notice provision as
opposed to a consent provision, did not place an absolute obstacle before
a pregnant minor seeking an abortion. Instead, Justice Kennedy viewed
the statute as representing a considered weighing of the competing in-
terests of minors and their parents.' 10
D. The Kennedy Majority
The Justices favoring the Kennedy dissent, with the addition ofJus-
tice O'Connor-who represented the swing vote between the two major-
ities-saved the two-parent notice component of the statute. Although
Justices Kennedy, Scalia, White and ChiefJustice Rehnquist would have
upheld the two-parent notice requirement without an appended judicial
bypass option, they were defeated by the Stevens majority. With the
addition of Justice O'Connor, however, the Kennedy group succeeded
in upholding the two-parent notification requirement when it was ac-
companied by the judicial bypass mechanism.
The Minnesota notification statute with a judicial bypass alternative
purportedly conformed to the framework supplied by the Bellotti II plu-
rality. The Kennedy majority noted that Bellotti II's guidelines would
support a two-parent consent or notification statute if it provided, as did
Minnesota's provision, for a sufficient judicial bypass alternative. I'
Minnesota's judicial bypass, according to the Kennedy majority, was
valid since it furnished mature and best-interests minors with an oppor-
tunity to avoid parental notification through a confidential judicial
proceeding. ' 12
The Kennedy majority also reconciled the decision in Matheson with
the facts presented by the Minnesota statute. Justice Kennedy observed
that, as in Matheson, if a two-parent notification statute is constitutional
as applied to immature minors whose best interests are served by notifi-
cation, but not as applied to mature or best interests minors, "a judicial
bypass is an expeditious and efficient means by which to separate the
applications of the law which are constitutional from those which are
not." 113 Thus legislatures are entitled to combat the wrongs of parental
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2964.
110. Id. at 2969.
Ill. Id. at 2970.
112. Id. at 2971.
113. Id.
19921
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
failure and social ills and still take reasonable measures to "recognize
and promote the privacy of the family tie. ' 14 This concept, maintained
Justice Kennedy, was destined to constitutional irrelevance under the
Stevens opinion. 15
E. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence with the Kennedy Opinion
In casting the decisive vote, Justice O'Connor concluded that inter-
ference in the intrafamily relationship associated with requiring two-par-
ent notice does not exist where the minor can avoid notification through
the use of the judicial bypass mechanism."16 If the questioned regula-
tion does not unduly burden the fundamental right, observed Justice
O'Connor, then the Court's evaluation is limited to a determination of
whether the regulation rationally relates to a legitimate state
purpose. "17
Justice O'Connor maintained, as did Justice Stevens, that Minnesota
offered no sufficient justification for the notice requirement's interfer-
ence with the family's decision-making processes." 8 In support of her
conclusion, she cited the stringent nature of the two-parent require-
ment, the ineffectiveness of the state's physical and sexual abuse excep-
tion, and the unreasonableness of requiring two-parent notice when
only one-half of the minors residing in Minnesota live with both biologi-
cal parents." 9 Emphasizing the Court's decision in Danforth, Justice
O'Connor further observed that the infirmities of the statute were ne-
gated by the inclusion of the judicial bypass option. She concluded that
the existence of such an alternative avoids unduly burdening the minor's
limited right to obtain an abortion and alleviates the possibility of paren-
tal notification serving as an absolute condition upon the minor's funda-
mental right. '
2 0
F. Justice Marshall Concurring and Dissenting in Part
Joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, Justice Marshall con-
curred in the judgment with respect to the Court's rejection of the "un-
reasonable and vastly overbroad requirement" that a pregnant minor
notify both her parents of her decision to obtain an abortion. 1 2 1 Justice
Marshall adopted the Stevens rationale for holding the two-parent noti-
fication requirement unconstitutional, and noted that the provision
would not satisfy the standard of strict scrutiny applicable to restrictions
114. Id. at 2972.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2951 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 2950. Justice O'Connor seems to apply the minimum rationality standard of
review to the regulation of a minor's fundamental right to abortion, whereas the Marshall
dissent would utilize the strict scrutiny standard applied in Roe. See supra note 26.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2950.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2960.
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on fundamental rights. 12 2 According to Justice Marshall the parental
notification requirement significantly restricted a young woman's repro-
ductive freedom and was not narrowly tailored to serve any compelling
state interest. Justice Marshall rejected the asserted state interest in pro-
tecting independent parental rights because the family's right against
state interference in personal matters would be undermined by govern-
mental intrusion in the form of forced compliance to the state's "arche-
type of the ideal family."' 123 Furthermore, he argued, the exercise of
parental authority in some instances obstructs the minor's decision to
have an abortion. Stern parental disapproval, with the threat of with-
drawal of financial support, accompanied by physical and emotional
abuse would effectively become an impermissible veto over the minor's
decision. '
2 4
Justice Marshall objected to forced notification of even a single par-
ent, an argument which served as a foundation for opposing the rigors
of a two-parent notification requirement. Justice Marshall observed that
any notification requirement violates the privacy right of pregnant mi-
nors who choose not to inform their parents and further precipitates
severe physical and psychological effects on the minor. 12 5 Additionally,
Justice Marshall observed that a single-parent notice requirement may
force some pregnant minors to travel outside of the state to obtain an
abortion and others to resort to self-induced or illegal abortions.
126
Justice Marshall vehemently dissented from the Kennedy decision,
reasoning that the mere presence of ajudicial bypass alternative did not
rid the underlying notice requirement of its unconstitutionality.1 2 7 The
Marshall dissent argued that the judicial bypass procedure could not sal-
vage the parental notification requirement because the procedure itself
was unconstitutional. The bypass was invalid, according to Justice Mar-
shall, since a court's refusal was the equivalent of a veto with respect to
women who were denied a judicial bypass and were forced either to
carry the fetus to term or were otherwise obstructed by their parents.' 2 8
The dissent argued that an immature minor has no less right to
make decisions regarding her own body than a mature adult, and that
the conditional defects in any provision effectively allowing for a third-
party veto were exacerbated by the vagueness of Minnesota's statute.'
29
In particular, the Marshall dissent challenged the standards, or lack
thereof, for determining the maturity and best interests of the pregnant
minor. '
30
The Marshall dissent then noted that the Court had never before
122. Id. at 2951.
123. Id. at 2956.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2953.
126. Id. at 2953-54.
127. Id. at 2952. The Justices also dissented from the portion of the Court's decision
upholding the 48 hour delay requirement. Id. at 2954.
128. Id. at 2957.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2958.
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addressed the constitutionality of a bypass option as applied.' 3 ' Justice
Marshall focused in large part on the factual findings of the district court
and concluded that the Minnesota bypass provision was an excessive
burden, not a remedy to an otherwise unconstitutional statute.' 32 He
argued that the statute "forces a young woman in an already dire situa-
tion to choose between two fundamentally unacceptable alternatives:
notifying a possibly dictatorial or even abusive parent and justifying her




A. The Minor's Rights
The historical attitude regarding children was one in which children
were regarded as personal property of their parents or appendages of an
entity, unable to develop an autonomous image.' 3 4 In effect, children
had no rights and were wholly subordinate to those who had power over
them whether in the family, the factory or the community. 135 The Chan-
cery Courts rejected appeals to subject parental authority to state inter-
vention and ignored the wishes of children when they conflicted with
those of their parents.136 Furthermore, minors-not recognized as per-
sons in their own right-could not consent to medical care, and physi-
cians feared charges of assault and battery if they treated minors without
first obtaining parental consent.'
37
Today, children are regarded as individuals, with constitutionally
protected rights,' 3 8 actively involved in decisions that affect their
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2960.
134. Nan Berger, The Child, the Law and the State, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: TOWARD THE
LIBERATION OF THE CHILD 153, 179 (1971).
135. Maxine Greene, An Overview of Children s Rights: A Moral and Ethical Perspective, in
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 1, 7 (Patricia A. Vardin & Ilene N.
Brody eds., 1979).
136. Berger, supra note 134, at 153. In effect, the father's rights were superior to those
of the child since mothers had few legal rights in relation to their children. Id. "The right
of a father to the custody and control of his children is one of the most sacred rights." Id.
(quoting Lord Justice James, Chancery Court (1878)).
For a discussion of the protective nature of the current juvenile court system, see
Laura J. Staples, Comment, Parental Notification Prior to Abortion: Is Minnesota s Statute Consis-
tent With Current Standards, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 653, 662-67 (1988)(discussing Harti-
gan v. Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1987), and the ruling in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d
1452 (8th Cir. 1988)).
137. Harriet F. Pilpel, Minors' Rights to Medical Care, 36 ALB. L. REV. 462, 463 (1972).
There are three recognized exceptions to the general rule requiring parental consent to
medical treatment of a child. First, parental consent is not required in emergency situa-
tions involving an immediate danger to life or limb. Id. at 464. The second exception
allows an emancipated minor to give effective consent provided he or she understands the
nature and consequences of the treatment. Id. at 464-65. Third, mature minors, even if
unemancipated, may give effective consent where the minor understands the nature and
consequences of the treatment. Id. at 466.
138. In re Gault, 387 U.S. i, 13 (1966)("neither the Fourteenth Amendment or the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone"). Juveniles are entitled to due process protection including
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lives.1 3 9 Remnants of the common law are evident, however, in parental
involvement statutes since some restrictions, having no legitimate basis
as applied to adults, may be used to purportedly further significant state
interests with respect to minors.
140
Justice Powell, writing for the plurality in Bellotti II, stated three jus-
tifications for sanctioning greater state regulation of the constitutional
rights of children: "[1] the peculiar vulnerability of children; [2] their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and
[3] the importance of the parental role in child rearing."' 14 1 The
Supreme Court, however, has yet to articulate a general theory that
properly balances the competing interests of the state, parent and
child. 1 42 At the core of these rival concerns and the inconsistencies in
the case law 14 3 preventing the formation of a standard "lies a contro-
versy over the scope of the Constitution's protection of the individual's
rights to autonomy and respect as a person."' 144 Although the Supreme
Court has addressed the minor's right to autonomy in developing the
constitutional right to privacy, the right has been "unduly limited [by]
the protection of biological parenthood."'
14 5
The inquiry, therefore, is "whether biological parenthood is the
proper locus for the constitutional values of autonomy and respect in-
herent in the right to privacy."' 46 In this sense, it would seem that re-
the rights to timely notice of the charges, assistance of counsel, the privilege against self-
incrimination and the rights to confrontation and cross-examination. Id. at 49-57.
139. Berger, supra note 134, at 179.
140. Richard F. Thomas, Comment, Distinguishing Guidelines for Minors Abortion Rights,
56 UMKC L. REV. 779, 780 (1988).
141. Id. (citing Bellotti I, 443 U.S. at 634); see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court stated that the protection of a minor's right to privacy would not be
equated with that of an adult since a significant state interest, as opposed to a compelling
state interest, would sustain restriction of a minor's fundamental rights. Carey v. Popula-
tion Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977)(The Court also questioned whether the
means employed by the New York legislature were related to the end it sought to
achieve.).
142. David A.J. Richards, The Individual, The Family, and The Constitution: A jurisprudential
Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 3 (1980). Failure to articulate such a theory is to some
extent a consequence of a judicial method focused on "cases and controversies" and "the
idea that a decision need only articulate those principles that are necessary to the reason-
able disposition of a particular case." Id.
143. Id. at 3-4. "Some decisions respect a child's right to autonomy, while others,
inexplicably, ignore it." Id. (discussing Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977)(constitutional right to privacy extends to minor's access to contraceptives despite
parental disapproval); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)(denial of hearing or re-
view after corporal punishment); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976)(parents cannot assert veto power over minor's constitutional right to privacy, abor-
tion); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)(to satisfy due process concerns, students enti-
tled to some form of hearing after suspension by school); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972)(parents' religious objections were sufficient to overcome the state's interest in
education beyond the eighth grade); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (19 69)(extending First Amendment rights to public school students); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)(state's interest in regulating child labor outweighed
parents' religious interest in having child distribute religious literature)).
144. Richards, supra note 142, at 4.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 4-5. "Protecting the nuclear family by the right to privacy may only rein-
force malign features of the American family." Id. at 5 n.36 (for a discussion of these
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quiring a minor to notify an absent parent of her intent to obtain an
abortion hinders the achievement of a proper balance between the op-
posing interests.
B. The Judicial Bypass Mechanism
While the judicial bypass may, in some instances, further the as-
serted state interest in protecting the welfare of pregnant minors with-
out unduly burdening the minor's fundamental right, courts are
selective in its application. The judicial bypass alternative allows only
mature and best-interest minors to circumvent the rigors of notifying
both parents. The mechanism provides no alternative to pregnant wo-
men deemed immature or to those minors whose best interests, accord-
ing to the juvenile court, would not be served without parental
notification. The limited application of the bypass, thus, forces the class
of immature and non best-interest minors either to adhere to the two-
parent notification requirement and its inherent burdens or to carry the
fetus to term.
The judicial bypass mechanism, however, is not flawed merely be-
cause it excludes some pregnant minors from an alternative to parental
notification. Rather, the procedure is warranted because the class of im-
mature and non best-interest minors that are denied circumvention of
the notice requirement arguably benefit from parental advice to a
greater extent than their mature and best-interest counterparts. The
real dilemma underlying the Hodgson holding concerns the ability to ap-
pend a judicial bypass option to salvage an otherwise unconstitutional
parental involvement requirement.
The judicial bypass option embodied in the Minnesota statute al-
lowed the core two-parent notification requirement to pass constitu-
tional muster. 14 7 Contrary to the holding of the Supreme Court, the
incorporation of a judicial bypass mechanism does not negate the many
burdens associated with the underlying two-parent notification require-
ment and thereby purge the statute of its unconstitutionality. 148 The
judicial proceeding exists not for the purpose of making an unconstitu-
tional notice provision constitutional, but because even a valid notice
requirement may be imposed only on minors who are immature or
whose best interests are not served by making the abortion decision
without parental involvement. 149 The bypass alternative is intended
only to address exceptions from a reasonable general rule and to
thereby preserve the constitutionality of the substantive requirement. 1
50
In contrast, statutes requiring single-parent involvement in the mi-
possible consequences, see ARLENE S. SKOLNICK, THE INTIMATE ENVIRONMENT: EXPLORING
MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 63, 134-35, 210-31 (2d ed. 1978).
147. The Court reaffirmed the Bellotti II guidelines for regulating a minor's fundamen-
tal right to obtain an abortion through the incorporation of a valid judicial bypass alterna-
tive. See Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2970.
148. See Hodgson, 853 F.2d at 1468 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Hodgson, I10 S. Ct. at 2948 (Stevens, J. dissenting). See infra notes 165-67 and
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nor's abortion decision are reasonable general rules. Therefore, when
an immature or non best-interest minor is denied judicial approval, she
faces a single-parent involvement provision that balances the competing
interests without unduly burdening her fundamental right.
C. The Two-Parent Notification Requirement
The Supreme Court effectively ignored the district court's extensive
factual determinations that were based on the operation of the statute
during the four and one-half years before it was enjoined.15' The Court
relied instead upon the incorporation of a valid judicial bypass alterna-
tive 1 52 to uphold the most restrictive parental notification statute in the
Nation. 1
53
In addition to Minnesota, only five' 54 of the thirteen states 15 5 man-
dating parental notification before the minor may obtain an abortion im-
pose a two-parent requirement. In comparison, five' 5 6 of the twenty-
three states' 5 7 requiring parental consent impose a two-parent require-
ment. Each of the other five two-parent notification statutes-even
where the statute does not include a valid judicial bypass158 -provide
exceptions to notice in the case of divorced or noncustodial parents, or
where notice is otherwise impossible.' 59 In contrast, the Minnesota
statute provides no exception for notice to a divorced, noncustodial or
disinterested biological parent. Furthermore, the statute makes no ex-
ception to notice for a parent, custodial or not, whom the minor consid-
ers likely to react abusively to notification, unless the minor declares that
accompanying text for a discussion of the burdens associated with the two-parent notifica-
tion requirement.
151. See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 759-70.
152. Bettotti 11, 443 U.S. at 622.
153. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2950 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
154. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-16-801 to 808 (Michie Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE § 18-
610(6) (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 81-63 to 68 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-4-202 (Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1990).
155. The seven parental notification statutes that impose one-parent requirements are
as follows: MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-3
(1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-2-107 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 442.255 (Michie
1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-11-110 to -118 (Michie 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-347
(1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.12 (Anderson 1987).
156. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790 (1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.731 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-51 to 57 (Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983); N.D. CEr. CODE §§ 14-02.1-03.1 to 04 (1991).
157. The 18 other consent statutes are as follows: ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 (1991);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-1 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1 (Michie 1991); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-7 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.070 (West 1988); ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-2152 (West Supp. 1990); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958 (West
Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001 (West Supp. 1991); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3206 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1991); ALA. CODE §§ 26.21-1 to 5 (Supp. 1990); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2.5 (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.35.5 (Supp.
1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1597-A (West Supp. 1990); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§§ 722.902 to .909 (West Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028 (Vernon Supp. 1991);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-7 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-41-30 to 37 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1990); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-118 (Supp. 1991).
158. After Hodgson, statutes that require parental involvement without providing ajudi-
cial bypass option for mature and best-interest minors are presumptively unconstitutional.
159. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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she is a victim of physical or sexual abuse. 160
The infirmities of this statute become more evident when one con-
siders the characteristics of the modern-day family. National statistics
indicate that approximately one out of every two marriages ends in di-
vorce, and a study suggests that only fifty percent of the minors residing
in Minnesota live with both biological parents. 16 1 Yet the statute makes
no exception for minors residing in a single-parent home even where
the minor has voluntarily notified the custodial parent. As a result,
twenty to twenty-five percent of the minors who choose to initiate the
judicial bypass procedure are either accompanied by one parent or have
voluntarily consulted one parent, but are nonetheless required to en-
dure the burdens of the court proceeding.
16 2
The two-parent notification requirement also ignores the existence
of dysfunctional two-parent homes. A pregnant minor, residing in such
a home, may choose to consult with one parent, but not the other, out of
fear of psychological, physical or sexual abuse directed toward her or
the notified parent. Considering that domestic violence occurs in at
least two million families in the United States, 163 the trauma inflicted
upon a pregnant minor in such circumstances is exacerbated by the bur-
densome choice of facing either the two-parent notice requirement or a
judicial bypass proceeding.
Only Justice Stevens, in a separate dissenting opinion, recognized
and addressed the significant distinction between a statute requiring the
involvement of both parents in the abortion decision and a statute re-
quiring the involvement of only one. 164 The Ashcroft Court, using an
ends-means analysis, upheld a statute requiring the pregnant minor to
either secure the consent of one parent or succeed in a judicial bypass
proceeding before she could obtain an abortion. 165 Justice Stevens
noted that a two-parent notification provision must also be tested by its
relationship to the legitimate state interests that it purportedly re-
flects.16 6 States have a "strong and legitimate interest in providing the
pregnant minor with the advice and support of a parent during the deci-
sional period."' 167 A single-parent provision, whether it requires con-
sent or notification, combined with a judicial bypass alternative, furthers
that legitimate interest without unduly burdening the minor's funda-
mental right. A provision, however, that requires a pregnant minor and
160. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(4)(c) (West 1989). Minors who are victims of physi-
cal or sexual abuse are often reluctant to report such abuse in order to invoke the excep-
tion. Reporting often results in parental notice and lost confidentiality. See Hodgson, 110
S. Ct. at 2950 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
161. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 768. See Brief for American Psychological Association as
Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 12-13, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct.
2629 (1990) (No. 88-1125)(by age 17, nearly 70% of white children, and 94% of black
children, will have lived in single-parent homes for some period of time).
162. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 769.
163. Id. at 768.
164. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2948 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.




a consenting parent to petition a court to override required notice to the
second parent constitutes an "unjustified intrusion into the family's de-
cisional process."' 68 The "minor and her custodial parent, by virtue of
their major interest and superior position, should alone have the oppor-
tunity to decide to whom, if anyone, notice of the minor's abortion deci-
sion should be given."'
169
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Hodgson further retreated from Roe by up-
holding unjustified regulation of a minor's right to choose abortion.
Although the conservative composition of the Court coupled with the
appropriate case may once again provide the states with limitless control
over a woman's freedom to choose abortion, 170 Hodgson seems limited
by allowing only for two-parent involvement in the minor's decision
where the statute includes a valid judicial bypass alternative. The rule
stands though Minnesota failed to establish that the two-parent notifica-
tion requirement was narrowly drawn to further, or actually served dur-
ing its operation,' 7 ' the asserted state interests in protecting the welfare
of pregnant minors, promoting intrafamily communication or improving
family integrity in any meaningful way.' 7 2 The statute actually served to
undermine those interests because minors who would ordinarily notify
one parent were often dissuaded from doing so when presented with the
opportunity to avoid notice through a judicial bypass alternative.
173
Furthermore, a minor does not make better informed decisions upon
counsel by a disinterested parent nor is family integrity fostered by forc-
ing the minor and her custodial parent to notify the noncustodial parent
of the minor's decision to obtain an abortion.
174
The Supreme Court has, by implication, elevated the interests of
noncustodial parents in the activities of their children to a level which
surpasses the combined interests of the custodial parent and pregnant
minor. After Hodgson, a pregnant minor who gains the consent of one
parent must either receive judicial approval of her decision or notify a
person who may have a propensity for abuse toward the minor or the
consenting parent.
The Court should have held the two-parent notification require-
ment, which provides no exception for divorce or desertion, unconstitu-
tional per se, and thus forced the Minnesota legislature to enact a statute
168. Id. at 2949.
169. Id.
170. President Bush appointed David H. Souter and Clarence Thomas to replace Jus-
tices William J. Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, respectively. Although Justices Souter
and Thomas have yet to articulate their views on a right to abortion, they will likely vote to
further restrict the minor's fundamental right.
171. For a discussion of facial and as-applied challenges, see Lisa K. Richmond, Note,
The Art of Constitutional Bootstrapping A Minor's Right to Abortion: Hodgson v. Minnesota, 34
S.D.L. REV. 158 (1989)(analysis of the Eighth Circuit's determination).
172. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 769.
173. Id.
174. See Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2955 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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consistent with those of the other thirty-five states that require only one-
parent involvement in a minor's abortion decision. A single-parent noti-
fication requirement and an appended judicial bypass option better bal-
ance the legitimate interests of the state in protecting pregnant minors,
the parents' interests in the control and well-being of their child and the
minor's need for autonomy. Such balance is accomplished without forc-
ing compliance to any elusive ideal of "the family" or exacerbating an
otherwise traumatic experience.
The rights of children must develop into a concept widely accepted
as a primary social value that influences social policy and planning at
every level.17 5 Moreover, the acceptance of the child as a person with
rights independent from those of his or her parents admits fully to the
child's individual human and legal rights. 176 Children should be en-
couraged to consult their parents, however, when they are faced with
making decisions as fundamental to their future as the choice to obtain
an abortion.' 77 In this context, "[p]erhaps the term 'parental responsi-
bility' should be substituted for 'parental rights,' emphasizing the social
obligation and accountability rather than suggesting a kind of finality
that cannot rationally be granted."' 7 8 The important societal interests
in protecting the welfare of our minors and encouraging communication
between parent and child should only be reflected in abortion regulation
that balances the competing interests of the state, parents and minor by
providing a method, such as the judicial bypass alternative, to address
exceptions from a constitutionally valid general rule.
James Shortall
175. Albert E. Wilkerson, Children's Rights, in THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: EMERGENT
CONCEPrS IN LAW AND SOCIETY 305 (Albert E. Wilkerson, ed., 1973).
176. Id.
177. Cf Richards, supra note 142, at 57.
[T]he willingness to allow people to experiment, make their own mistakes, and
learn from bearing the consequences is part of the education in self-awareness
that rights cultivate. We allow adolescents their rights to privacy because it ap-
pears, in the contexts of contraception and abortion, that we thus better respect
their potential for dignity. Any mistakes they make in exercising these rights not
only do not appear irreparable but also appear to be of the kind that will better
enable them to achieve a rational vision of their own good.
Id.
178. Wilkerson, supra note 175, at 305-06. See also Richards, supra note 142, at 57.
[A]dults have a special responsibility for affording the kind of education that will
enable children to exercise these rights wisely. It is cruel folly to extend the right
of privacy to children and not, concomitantly, to ensure the kind of sexual educa-
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Generally, parental consent and notice statutes apply to pregnant minors who are
under eighteen years of age, unmarried, and otherwise unemancipated. Statutes provid-
ing a judicial bypass option typically waive the parental involvement provision where the
minor establishes either that she is mature and capable of giving informed consent or that
the abortion is in her best interest.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76- Parent(s)* or Legal No * Notice, if possible.
7-304 (1990) Guardians
W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-3 Parent or Legal Yes* * 24 hours Actual
(1985) Guardian Notice;
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Generally, parental consent and notice statutes apply to pregnant minors who are
under eighteen years of age, unmarried, and otherwise unemancipated. Statutes provid-
ing a judicial bypass option typically waive the parental involvement provision where the
minor establishes either that she is mature and capable of giving informed consent or that
the abortion is in her best interest without parental involvement.
* Idaho, Tennessee and Utah require a pregnant minor to notify her "parents" of her
intent to obtain an abortion, but do not specify whether "parents" refers to either of the
parents or both parents. Nor do these states specify whether notice to one parent would
constitute constructive notice to the other parent. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2931 n.5.
•* Maryland and West Virginia allow a physician to perform an abortion on a pregnant
minor, without parental notification, where the physician determines-in his or her profes-
sional judgment-that the minor is either mature and capable of giving informed consent
or where parental notification would not be in the minor's best interest. MD. HEALTH-
GENERAL CODE ANN. § 20-103(c)(i) (Supp. 1991)(physician may also perform the abortion,
without parental notice, where the physician determines that notice may lead to physical or
emotioinal abuse of the minor); W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-3(c) (1985)(the physician waiving
the notice requirement must not be associated professionally or financially with the physi-
cian who is to perform the abortion; physician's waiver is independent from the judicial
bypass alternative of § 16-2F-4).
•** Statute is currently enjoined from enforcement.
